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awrence Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development has been enormously 
influential in psychology. As Dr. Julie 
Dunlap states, his work has been 
concerned exclusively with the 
development of our moral attitudes 
toward other humans. Her research is a welcome 
attempt to use Kohlberg's theory to probe for 
the development of moral concern about non-
human animals and nature in general. 
We should be aware, however, as Dr. Dunlap is, 
that some serious doubts about Kohlberg's 
theory have been raised by psychologists and 
philosophers. Kohlberg holds that there is a 
fixed, invariant sequence of stages through 
which humans progress as their moral thinking 
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becomes increasingly adequate. These stages are 
subdivisions of three levels: (I) preconventional 
or egocentric (Stages 1 and 2), (II) conventional 
(Stages 3 and 4), and (III) post-conventional 
(Stages 5 and 6).1 There is ample evidence for 
the existence of these three levels. We can see 
them in our own histories and in many around 
us. There are those who require threats of pun-
ishment or promises of rewards to abide by 
moral rules; those who accept such rules without 
question, happy to follow authority and majority 
opinion; and those who are capable of 
autonomous thinking about morality. In this 
respect, our intuitions seem to match carefully 
gathered psychological data. Nevertheless, a 
number of problems have surfaced. Even 
Kohlberg's own research began to reveal serious 
flaws in his scheme. To mention just one serious 
problem, male subjects who were scored at Stage 
5 or 4 in high school went off to college and, 
contrary to the theory, apparently regressed to 
egocentric relativism (Stage 2).2 Even more trou-
bling to many was the fact that female subjects 
tested by the Kohlberg dilemmas tended to be 
rated as less morally developed than many of 
their male counterparts. As Dr. Dunlap notes, 
Carol Gilligan has argued extensively that these 
results reveal the Kohlberg theory to be biased 
against females and excessively narrow in its 
exclusive focus on justice concerns in moral 
thinking.3 
In(response to his problematical data, 
Kohlberg considered but eventually rejected 
allowing for moral regression in his theory. He 
decided instead to revise his scoring manual. 
Boys formerly classified as having reached the 
post-conventional level were retroactively clas-
sified as conventional. Their "Stage 2" egocen-
trism was construed as a transitional phase 
between Stages 4 and 5.4 Moreover, in response 
to Carol Gilligan's criticisms, Kohlberg changed 
his classification of male "law and order," Archie 
Bunker-type responses from Stage 4 to Stage 3, 
thus further lowering overall male scores. As a 
result of the scoring manual revisions, the evi-
dence of significant regression disappeared, as 
well as the comparatively poor showing of 
women.s Kohlberg now believes that Stage 5 will 
only be attained by a minority of adult humans.6 
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All his former Stage 6 scores disappeared with 
the revision, leaving Kohlberg to speculate that 
only a very few extraordinary individuals (e.g., 
Socrates, Christ, Gandhi, and King) are fully 
autonomous moral thinkers.7 
However, the fact remains that Kohlberg's for-
merly high-scoring high school boys, reclassified 
as conventional, did appear to give autonomous, 
principled responses to the dilemmas. Kohlberg 
resolved this discrepancy by making two new the-
oretical postulations: a conventional substage A 
and a substage B which he characterizes as "the 
autonomous substage of conventional thinking."8 
Thus, the boys' responses are now scored as 
being both conventional and autonomous, and 
the anomalies in the data have magically disap-
peared.9 
One cannot help feeling uneasy about this way 
of dealing with a theoretical crisis. Consider 
Kohlberg's own description of his decision to 
recategorize his data: 
Because it was unsatisfactory to include 
regression or retrogression in a moral stage 
scheme, we were led to (a) revise definitions 
of Stage 5 (and 6) and (b) to make a dis-
tinction between a more morally 
autonomous B substage and a less 
autonomous A substage at the conventional 
level. 10 
The ad hoc air of this maneuver is hardly dis-
pelled by Kohlberg's name for it: "our circular 
boot-strapping approach."l1 
However, even if one has serious reservations 
about Kohlberg's classification scheme, it can still 
be used to show whether adolescents who are 
engaged in moral reasoning think about animals 
or the environment in general in the same way in 
which they think about humans. If we use the 
scheme, eyes wide open to its limitations, we 
should be able to find out something. 
It's interesting that Kohlberg himself asks 
questions about animals in his follow-up inter-
views for the "Heinz" and "Doctor" dilemmas. 
The following optional questions appears in the 
Heinz interview: "Suppose it is a pet animal he 
loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet 
animal?"12 In the Doctor interview the animal-
related question is not optional: "When a pet 
Spring 1989 
Kohlberg and Concern for Nonhumans 
animal is badly wounded and will die, it is killed 
to put it out of its pain. Does the same thing 
apply here?"13 One has a strong suspicion that 
Kohlberg's intent here is to classify answers that 
distinguish between animal and human cases as 
higher-level than those which do not. Elsewhere 
Kohlberg gives us the following example of 
Stage 1 moral thinking: "At the age of four my 
son joined the pacifist and vegetarian 
movement and refused to eat meat because, he 
said, it is bad to kill animals."14 According to 
Kohlberg, he and his wife were forced to pose 
and try to answer this question: "Why is it all 
right to' kill and eat animals but not humans?" 
For six months all their arguments about 'Jus-
tified" as opposed to "unjustified" killing fell on 
unresponsive Stage 1 ears. I5 
By contrast, Dr. Dunlap's research exhibits 
no such preconceptions. She has constructed 
dilemmas and follow-up questions which allow 
her to compare adolescents' responses to par-
allel human and animal moral quandaries in a 
systematic way. Her data do indeed indicate 
that boys are capable of showing moral concern 
about animals and the environment in general, 
contrary to Nash's speculation that such 
concern could only arise after Stage 6 has been 
achieved (making any such individuals scarcer 
than hen's teeth on Kohlberg's current scoring 
system). While this is encouraging news to 
those of us who share these concerns, however, 
there are grounds for caution in our interpre-
tation of the data. 
First, although Dr. Dunlap repeatedly states 
that the boys she tested used the same "moral 
logic" to address the animal and human 
dilemmas, the moral stage scores for the animal 
dilemmas are consistently lower than stage 
scores for the parallel human cases. 
Although the overlap indicates that some 
boys did reason at the same stage for humans 
and animals, a good many apparently did not. 
(We all know such people. An extremely intel-
ligent, caring physician recently told me quite 
seriously that it was ridiculous to try to "save 
the whales." He explained that they were no 
longer "good for anything" since we have 
stopped needing oil lamps and corsets.) 
Second, even if the boy does reason at the 
same stage for animals as for humans, this does 
not necessarily mean that he regards them as 
being on a moral par. For example, Kohlberg 
reports the following response from a ten-year-
old boy to one of his animal related questions 
(i.e., should the doctor put the woman out of 
her misery as one would a badly wounded pet?): 
But the husband wouldn't want it, it's not 
like an animal. If a pet dies you can get 
along without it - it isn't something you 
really need. Well, you can get a new wife, 
but it's not really the same. 16 
The boy is consistently reasoning at Stage 2 
here in seeing pet and wife in terms of their 
instrumental value to the husband, but the 
animal is clearly downgraded in comparison to 
the wife. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Dunlap's data clearly do 
demonstrate genuine concern for animals 
among some boys at Stages 3 and 4. She was 
also able to elicit some more general pro-envi-
ronment sentiments. However, despite the title 
of her paper, the dilemmas she has devised are 
really more suitable as tests of adolescents' atti-
tudes toward individual animals than their atti-
tudes toward the environment as such. All six 
of her animal dilemmas are concerned with 
individual animals, and four of the six concern 
domestic animals. Environmental ethics, when 
it is concerned with animals at all, focuses on 
wild animals; undoubtedly, this is the reason for 
Dr. Dunlap's wild chimpanzee dilemmas. But 
environmental ethics encompasses much more 
as well: concern for nonsentient living beings, 
for ecological systems, even for (according to 
some environmental ethicists) the nonliving 
parts of nature. Perhaps some additional 
dilemmas could be constructed to test for these 
concerns. For example, "Should Heinz sab-
otage logging equipment in order to save a 
redwood?" "Should Senator Gallo fight or 
support her constituents' desire to turn a 
wilderness area into a shopping mall?" 
Although the Kohlberg scheme was designed to 
test for moral reasoning about sentient indi-
viduals, perhaps it could be extended in such a 
way to encompass more environmental ethical 
concerns. 
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Many of Dr. Dunlap's subjects did express one 
concern which environmental ethicists share the 
desire for preserving members of rare species. I 
fear, however, that much of that concern arose 
from the belief that rare animals, unlike 
"common" animals, are simply less replaceable. 
This con tempt for "common," allegedly 
"replaceable" animals can generate concern for 
endangered species, but it has very unfavorable 
implications for many individual animals. Those 
who believe that individual sentient animals are 
morally considerable cannot take heart in such 
an attitude, although many environmental ethi-
cists can. 
The good news in all this for those who are con-
cerned about nonhumans is that many adolescents 
can and do show empathetic, caring responses for 
those who don't belong to their own species. Some 
- those who are able to criticize human society 
and who suggest that we have behaved irrespon-
sibly toward animals and the environment in 
general - are even capable of autonomous 
thinking. This is especially encouraging, since 
those who are capable of questioning societal 
norms and behavior are capable of perceiving and 
rejecting prejudices such as homocentrism and 
speciesism. Whether we classify these young 
people's responses as Stage 5 or 6, or as "substage 
B," is really not all that important. At least, as Dr. 
Dunlap has shown, concern for nonhumans is not 
restricted to a tiny, possibly mythical elite of sages 
even more advanced than Socrates. 
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The following prose-poem is written in 
memory of Paulette Nenner. Paulette 
was an artist and an animal rights 
activist. Though neither of us had ever 
met Dian Fossey, we shared a long-
standing admiration for the woman and 
her work that began for both of us when 
we first saw those early National 
Geographic films of Dian interacting 
with free gorillas, especially with her 
beloved Digit. Paulette said that 
someday she wanted to go to Rwanda 
and help patrol the mountains for 
poachers. She never made it. She died 
of pneumonia in March, 1988 in New 
York City. But I like to think she did at 
last get to meet her heroine, the woman 
on the mountain. 
- Paulette Callen 
Nutley, NewJersey 
A Gorilla In The Mist 
A gorilla stands waiting in the mist. 
He is content to wait a long time. 
His name...unassuming-from a 
damaged finger; a shy and gentle being 
who died with great courage, alone, 
amid savagery, fighting for his family; 
and for him, the woman on the 
mountain grieved and caused a 
thoughtless world to take note and mark 
his passing. 
She too died, in a way, alone, fighting 
for her family, amid savagery. 
The Cree say that when a human being 
dies, the soul must stand within a circle 
of animals--all those one has abused, or 
killed without need and without 
respect-in the misty land of the dead, 
and woe be unto that soul! 
It is also said by those who have died 
and come back that there is, after death, 
a moving toward a great light, and that 
along the way one encounters helpers 
who comfort and encourage us on this 
journey. 
The woman on the mountain...when her 
turn came...there would have been no 
circle of animal judges to try her. 
She moves toward the light. 
And out of the mists there steps one 
to meet her. 
The one she called Digit. 
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